JONES v. BOCK: NEW CLARITY
UNDER THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORM ACT
SQUIRE SERVANCE*

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2007, the Supreme Court decided the consolidated
cases of Jones v. Bock,1 Williams v. Overton,2 and Walton v. Bouchard,3
all of which were Sixth Circuit cases. In a unanimous decision,4 the
Supreme Court clarified what constitutes exhaustion of prison
grievance procedures under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PLRA).5 The Court also offered its view on the correct way to
balance the burden between prisoner plaintiffs and the judiciary,
6
which labors to process prisoner complaints. Broken into three
discreet issues, the essential holding provides a small victory for
prison litigants. First, it established that a prisoner litigating under the
PLRA does not have the burden to plead and demonstrate
exhaustion in the complaint. Rather, the defendant must raise lack of
exhaustion as an affirmative defense.7 Second, it addressed whether a
prisoner’s initial administrative grievance must identify and name all
the individuals charged in its complaint.8 This determination lowered
the bar outlined by the Sixth Circuit. Finally, it reviewed whether the
PLRA requires dismissal of an entire complaint when some, but not

* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Jones v. Bock, 135 F. App’x. 837 (6th Cir 2005).
2. Williams v. Overton, 136 F. App’x. 846 (6th Cir 2005).
3. Walton v. Bouchard, 136 F. App’x. 859 (6th Cir 2005).
4. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007).
5. 110 Stat. 1321-71, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.
6. Tim Birnbaum and Peter Milligan, Supreme Court Oral Argument Previews: Jones v.
Michigan Dept. of Corrections (05-7058), LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE: SUPREME COURT
ORAL ARGUMENT PREVIEWS, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/05-7058.html (last visited
Feb. 8, 2007).
7. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 918.
8. Id. at 922–23.

76

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

VOL. 3:75

all of the claims asserted have been exhausted. Once again, this issue
9
was decided in favor of prisoners’ rights.
II. RELEVANT LAW: THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner has the right to file a civil rights
claim in federal court if the prisoner believes that his or her civil
rights have been violated. There are thousands of these cases filed
every year.10 “Congress enacted the PLRA in 1996 with the intent that
it would ‘reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner
11
suits.’” The PLRA, in an effort to judicially screen prisoner
complaints, requires prisoners to exhaust prison grievance procedures
before filing suit in federal court.12 Thus, under the PLRA, prisoners
must adhere to strict jurisdictional requirements in order to
13
effectively file a suit.
III. FACTS
The petitioners were all inmates in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC).14 The instructions for filing a
grievance in the MDOC were as follows:
Inmates must first attempt to resolve a problem orally within two
business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue. If oral
resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the
grievance process, and submit a completed grievance form within five
business days of the attempted oral resolution. The Step I grievance
form provided by MDOC (a one-page form on which the inmate fills
out identifying information and is given space to describe the
complaint) advises inmates to be ‘brief and concise in describing your
grievance issue.’ The inmate submits the grievance to a designated

9. Id. at 924.
10. Birnbaum and Milligan, supra note 6.
11. Id. (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)). One commentator wrote:
The PLRA has resulted directly in effective yet controversial results. First, the
intended goals of the PLRA to reduce the quantity of prisoner litigation have been
realized: the federal court system has experienced a dramatic decrease in prisoner
cases (from 42,000 inmate civil rights petitions in 1995 to 26,000 petitions in 2000).
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grievance coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent-generally the
15
supervisor of the person being grieved.

If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, he may
appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within five business
days of the response, and submitting the appeal within five business
days of obtaining the form. The respondent at Step II is designated by
the policy, (e.g., the regional health administrator for medical care
grievances). If still dissatisfied after Step II, the inmate may further
appeal to Step III using the same appeal form; the MDOC director is
designated as respondent for all Step III appeals.16
In November 2000, Lorenzo Jones, an inmate, sustained injuries to
17
his neck and back during a vehicle accident. Several months later
Jones was given a work assignment that he claimed he could not
18
perform due to his injuries. Jones informed the staff member that he
could not work, but was allegedly told to do the work or “suffer the
19
consequences.” Subsequently, Jones performed the task and
allegedly aggravated his injuries.20 After unsuccessfully seeking
redress via the MDOC’s grievance process, Jones filed a complaint in
the Eastern District of Michigan against six individuals: the staff
worker that forced him to work, the staff worker in charge of work
assignments, the warden, a deputy warden, a registered nurse, and a
physician. 21
A magistrate recommended the dismissal of all claims for the
failure to state a claim with respect to all individuals except the staff
worker who forced Jones to work and the staff worker in charge of
22
work assignments. The District Court, however, held that there
should be a dismissal of claims against all of the parties.23 Jones’s
complaint provided the dates on which his claims were filed at various
steps of the MDOC grievance procedures; however, he did not attach
copies of the grievance forms or adequately describe the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916–17.
Id. at 917.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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24
proceedings. Even though the respondents attached copies of all of
Jones’s grievances to their own motion to dismiss, the District Court
ruled that Jones’s failure to plead exhaustion in his complaint could
not be cured.25 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision
because “Jones failed to comply with the specific pleading
requirements applied to PLRA suits” and because “even if Jones had
shown that he exhausted the claims against Morrison [the staff
member worker in charge of work assignments] and Opanasenko [the
staff worker that forced Jones to work], dismissal was still required
under the total exhaustion26 rule.”27
In Williams v. Overton, prisoner Timothy Williams suffered from
noninvoluting cavernous hemangiomas in his right arm, a condition
that causes pain, immobility, and disfigurement of the limb.28 Williams
filed a complaint claiming that the Department of Corrections
prevented him from obtaining proper medical care for his medical
condition.29 The Eastern District of Michigan Court held that Williams
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not
identify all of the respondents in his lawsuit during the grievance
process.30 As a result, the District Court applied the total exhaustion
rule and dismissed the entire suit, despite the plaintiff’s claim that he
31
had properly exhausted the grievance procedures. The Sixth Circuit
32
affirmed.
In Walton v. Bouchard, prisoner John Walton assaulted a guard
and was sanctioned with an indefinite “upper slot” restriction.33
Walton later found out that other prisoners with the same infraction
34
were given only a three-month “upper slot” restriction. He filed a
complaint claiming that this disparity was racially motivated.35 The
Western District of Michigan Court dismissed this lawsuit because

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Total exhaustion means that a complaint containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims cannot be adjudicated. See id. at 924–25.
27. Id. at 917.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 917–18.
31. Id. at 918.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Walton did not name all of the individuals he was currently filing a
36
complaint against in his initial administrative grievance. “His claims
against the other respondents were thus not properly exhausted, and
the court dismissed the entire action under the total exhaustion
rule.”37 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.38 It reiterated its requirement that a
prisoner must file a grievance at Step I of the MDOC grievance
process against the person he ultimately seeks to sue. 39
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court.
The Court’s holding was three-fold: (1) under the PLRA, failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints;40 (2) under the
PLRA, compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is
required to “properly exhaust” a claim and failure to name an
individual that is later sued, is not per se inadequate;41 (3) the PLRA
does not require the dismissal of the entire complaint when some, but
not all, of the claims in the complaint have been exhausted.42 The
Court reversed and remanded all of the Sixth Circuit rulings.
A. Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense.
The Court noted that, under the PLRA, exhaustion was
mandatory for a claim to be brought into court, but that the PLRA
was silent on the issue of whether exhaustion must be pleaded by the
plaintiff or is an affirmative defense.43 The usual practice under the
44
Federal Rules is to regard exhaustion as an affirmative defense.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “[c]ourts should generally not depart
from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of
perceived policy concerns.”45 Therefore, the silence of the PLRA is

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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46
strong evidence that the usual practice should be followed. The Sixth
Circuit view that prisoners are required to plead and demonstrate
exhaustion in their complaints was a minority view and is considered
by the Court outside the typical litigation framework.47 There was no
justifiable reason for the Sixth Circuit to deviate from the usual
procedural practice beyond the departures specified by the PLRA
itself.48 The Court held that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense
and inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate
49
exhaustion in their complaints.
There are two important policy reasons that support the Court’s
decision that Chief Justice Roberts did not address. First, many
prisoners who file complaints are filing pro se, thereby the courts treat
50
their pleadings in a more liberal fashion by ignoring imperfections.
Furthermore, “[c]ourts recognize that prisoners are frequently
”51
uneducated, unsophisticated, and legally inexperienced. Forcing
prisoners to succumb to a heightened and highly technical pleading
requirement by requiring them to show exhaustion would be
considered an intolerant pleading standard.52 Such a requirement
would cause prisoners who make even minor mistakes in the
administrative grievance process and in their pleadings to have their
complaints dismissed.53 From a public policy perspective, applying this
heightened pleading requirement to prisoner complaints appears
improper.
Secondly, it is more proper to have the prison officials bear the
burden of pleading administrative exhaustion because they have
54
better access to the resources that such pleading requires. “Prison
officials have lawyers and [have] greater access to the prison records
than prisoners . . . . With their access to prison records, they are better
equipped to provide the court with documentation and explanations

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 918.
50. Jamie Ayers, Commentary, To Plead or Not to Plead: Does the Prison Litigation
Reform Act’s Exhaustion Requirement Establish a Pleading Requirement or an Affirmative
Defense?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 247, 272 (2005).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 272–73
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55
of administrative proceedings.” Moreover, because prison officials
have control over the prison administrative procedures, they have the
ability to make it difficult for prisoners to fulfill the exhaustion
requirements,56 thereby precluding the prisoner from bringing a valid
57
suit in court.
Overall, treating the exhaustion requirement as an affirmative
defense, as opposed to an absolute bar, correctly balances between
frivolous prisoner litigation and unduly burdensome pleading.

B. Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required
to “properly exhaust” a claim.
The Court went on to address what is needed to fulfill the
“exhaustion” requirement of the PLRA. The Sixth Circuit judicially
creates a rule that a claimant must specifically “name all of the
defendants” in the first step of the grievance process to fulfill the
“exhaustion” requirement of the PLRA. However, there is no textual
basis in the PLRA for this requirement.58 “Nothing in the MDOC
policy itself supports the conclusion that the grievance process [is]
improperly invoked simply because an individual later named as a
defendant [is] not named at the first step of the grievance process.”59
The Court correctly held that the PLRA requirement of “proper
exhaustion” is fulfilled by complete compliance with the prison
grievance procedures.60 “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to
comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system
and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the
PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”61
C. The PLRA does not follow the total exhaustion rule.
The final issue the Court addressed concerns the total exhaustion
rule and what happens when a claimant failed to exhaust some, but
not all, of the claims asserted in the complaint.62 PLRA section 1997

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 273.
Id.
Id.
Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 922–23.
Id. at 923.
Id.

82

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

VOL. 3:75

states “[n]o action shall be brought” unless administrative procedures
63
are exhausted. The Court rejected the respondent’s statutory
interpretation of PLRA Section 1997e(a), which asserted that if
Congress intended courts to dismiss only unexhausted claims while
retaining the balance of the lawsuit Congress would have used the
word “claim” rather than “action.” The Court noted the statutory
phrasing “no action shall be brought” is boilerplate language and that
there were many instances where that same language was used, but
that had not been thought to lead to the dismissal of an entire action
where a single claim failed to meet the pertinent standards.64 The
norm is that if a complaint contains both good and bad claims, the
65
court would leave the bad claims and continue with the good ones. If
Congress wanted to depart from this, it would have specifically made
66
that clear in the PLRA.
The Court noted that there was no indication of a congressional
67
departure in this instance. This is in line with the respondent’s policy
argument that because the PLRA was created as a tool for early
judicial screening and a way to reduce the burden of prisoner
litigation on the courts, the total exhaustion rule would allow courts to
68
promptly dismiss an action upon identifying an unexhausted claim.
The Court was not persuaded by this argument and noted that the use
of the total exhaustion rule would push inmates towards filing various
separate claims, to avoid the possibility of an unexhausted claim
tainting the others.69 That would promote the opposite purpose of the
PLRA.70 Therefore, the total exhaustion rule does not apply to the
PLRA.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the PLRA was to address the large number of
prisoner complaints filed in the federal courts and to provide a
practical screening mechanism to help filter out unwarranted claims.71

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 924.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 925.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 925–26.
Id. at 914.
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However, the Sixth Circuit seems to have used this law to exclude
prisoner complaints on even the slightest and most minor of
technicalities. By setting clear guidelines regarding what a prisoner
must do to exhaust prison grievance procedures, this decision has
helped to allay the confusion among circuits, among prisoners, and
among attorneys. The lower courts can now be clear that: (1) failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to
72
specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints; (2)
compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required to
“properly exhaust” a claim;73 and (3) the PLRA does not require the
dismissal of the entire complaint, when some, but not all, of the claims
74
in the complaint have been exhausted.

72. Id. at 918.
73. Id. at 922–23.
74. Id. at 924.

